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I.

INTRODUCTION
A. Scope

This memorandum surveys the principles governing pretrial contact with opposite party
witnesses in international criminal courts, in the European Court of Human Rights, and in the
national courts of common law jurisdictions.∗ The focus on common law countries is consistent
with the Special Court for Sierra Leone’s more common law-oriented approach in comparison
with other international tribunals, and also reflects resource limitations. More importantly,
however, it reflects the fact that in civil law jurisdictions it is uncommon for counsel to pursue
direct, pretrial contacts with witnesses at all.1 Since reported case law addressing the specific

∗

“In international criminal courts and national legal systems, what rights does the Defence have
to contact Prosecution witnesses for the preparation of their case?” Expanded pursuant to a
February 21 email from Deputy Prosecutor Christopher Staker, which stated in part, “I would be
grateful if we could ask you to expand your research to deal generally with the question of the
rights of a party (Prosecution or Defence) to contact witnesses of the other party for the
preparation of their case.”
1
See, e.g., Stewart Field & Andrew West, Dialogue and the Inquisitorial Tradition: French
Defence Lawyers in the Pre-Trial Criminal Process, 14 CRIM. L. REV. 261, 296-97 (2003)
(describing the extreme reluctance of French defence lawyers to conduct their own investigations
and call their own witnesses) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 124]. It may be
worth noting in passing the principles that will govern the civil law-oriented Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. Article 33 of the Cambodian Bar’s Code of Ethics states
that defence counsel “must abstain from meeting a potential witness,” and any inquiries for
witnesses must be channeled through the investigative judge. Mohamed C. Othman & Scott
Worden, Cambodia: Extraordinary Chambers, in DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS: CASES, MATERIALS & COMMENTARY 830, 864 (Michael Bohlander et al., eds.,
2006). [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 127]. While counsel before the ECCC will
be bound by the Code of Ethics, Othman and Worden observe that interviews by defense counsel
are in practice common in Cambodia, and it remains to be seen how the ECCC will ultimately
interpret or even revise the rule on witness contact. Id. The ECCC’s Draft Internal Rules do not
much clarify the matter. The only interview procedures discussed in the rules are interview by
the investigative judges. R. 63, Draft Internal Rules, Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia, 3 November 2006, available at
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/files/IR_ECCC_Draft-Internal-Rules.pdf. [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 122]. That defence interviews are contemplated, subject to
11
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issue of pretrial witness contact is limited, this memorandum looks also to the balancing
principles courts employ with regard to disclosure of witness information.
B. Summary of conclusions
i. National courts and international tribunals generally recognize that
conflicting defence and witness interests should be balanced by the
court.
`

Case law from a wide variety of common law jurisdictions, as well as the ICTY, ICTR

and ECHR, recognizes the power of trial courts balance, on the facts of individual cases, the
right of the accused to prepare his defence and examine witnesses against the right of witnesses
to protection of their privacy, safety and identities. In particular, the case law of the European
Court (recognized by the ICTY) requires that courts employ the least restrictive means that will
effectively safeguard the witness.
ii. For the regulation of contacts with witnesses whose identities have
been disclosed, a balancing exercise may be necessary only to the
extent that contacts are either limited by, or compelled by, the court.
While balancing principles are widely employed in relating to the disclosure of
information about witnesses, it does not necessarily follow that a similar balancing exercise by
the court is called for with regard to contacts with witnesses whose identities are known. The
general rule is one of equal opportunity to access identified witnesses. To the extent that
limitations on the manner of interviews or other contacts are sought, however, a similar
balancing is appropriate. The same is true of the extraordinary practice of interview subpoenas.

restrictions, is however implied by the rule establishing protective measures, since the first listed
measure is “declaring [a witness’s] contact address to be that of their lawyers or their Victims’
Association, as appropriate, or of the ECCC.” Id. at R. 34(4)(a).
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iii. It is generally accepted that both parties have an equal right to
consult witnesses.
It has become a truism in the common law that there is no property in a witness, and
it follows from that principle that neither the prosecution nor the defence may categorically
deprive one another of the opportunity to consult a witness. On this point the Special Court
for Sierra Leone and the courts of South Africa appear exceptional in that they require
either consent by the calling party or leave of the court to consult a witness.
iv. National courts differ as to the appropriate procedure for initial
contact with opposing witnesses.
The general principle of equal access does not necessarily dictate the whether a witness
whether communication with an opposing witness should initially be done by opposing counsel
directly, or by the calling party or a representative of the court as an intermediary. Differences in
practice on this point reflect that the reality that both the calling and the opposing party will have
conflicts of motive in how they go about asking whether a witness will consent to an interview.
v. Initial contact by court personnel is a reasonable alternative to
contact by the calling or opposing party.
In light of the difficulties inherent in the handling of initial witness contacts by either
party, the use of a neutral intermediary is a desirable alternative. In the ICTR, this role is fulfilled
by the Registrar, while in the Special Court for Sierra Leone it is assigned to the Witnesses and
Victims Section. In either case, court personnel may be in the best position to convey to
witnesses both the desirability of cooperation for the fairness of the trial process and the full right
of the witness to decline an interview.
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vi. National courts generally do not require the presence of the calling
party for witness interviews.
National courts generally do not grant the calling party the right to demand attendance at
pretrial interviews by the opposing party – although it may be considered preferable for opposing
counsel to extend an invitation. This position is evidently rooted in the principle of no property
in a witness and in the interest in unfettered discussion with witnesses. By contrast, South Africa
requires attendance by the prosecution at all interviews of State witnesses.
vii. The ICTR, but not the ICTY, appears to require Prosecution
attendance at interview of its witnesses by the defence.
The ICTY, in accord with common law courts, has declined to require attendance by the
calling party at pretrial interviews, relying instead on recommendations that the calling party be
notified and that, ideally, interviews be recorded. The ICTR has taken the opposite position,
transforming a recommendation for British lawyers into a requirement that the calling party
attend interviews with its witnesses in order to ensure fairness and transparency.
viii. Exclusion of the accused from interviews by defence counsel is an
accepted precaution in appropriate circumstances.
Courts may use a variety of limitations on witness contacts to protect witnesses,
encourage their cooperation and ensure the integrity of the process; among these is the
requirement that defence counsel conduct interviews in the absence of the accused. In contrast to
the controversial British system requiring “special advocates” to withhold sensitive information
from defendants, personal exclusion from interviews risks only minimal interference with the
attorney-client relationship and does not threaten attorney-client trust.
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ix. National jurisdictions recognize an absolute right of witnesses to
refuse pretrial consultation.
In the jurisdictions surveyed it is universally held that the right to access witnesses does
not include a corresponding duty of witnesses to cooperate. The subpoena power may be used
only for sworn testimony or depositions, not for private interviews. Following an oral decision of
ICTY Trial Chamber II, the Special Court’s Trial Chamber I one has embraced this position –
notwithstanding contrary precedent in the ICTY
x. The exceptional characteristics and mandate of international criminal
tribunals may justify the issuance of subpoenas for pretrial
consultation.
In stark contrast to the case law of national courts, the Appeals Chamber has explicitly
approved of subpoenas for pretrial interviews as an exercise of the court’s general procedural
power, and this practice has been followed by the Trial Chambers of the ICTR. While this
constitutes an unprecedented use of the threat of penal sanctions against witnesses, it may be
justified in light of the exceptional needs of international criminal tribunals for the fullest
possible evidence and the fairest possible process for the accused.
II.

WITNESS PROTECTION IN THE SPECIAL COURT TO DATE

The general approach of the Special Court to witness protection was stated in many of its
early decisions. The Special Court seeks “to guarantee the utmost protection and respect for the
rights of the victims and witnesses,” but also
to balance those rights with the competing interests of the public in the
administration of justice, of the international community in ensuring that persons
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accused of violations of humanitarian law be brought to trial on the one hand, and
the paramount due process right of the Accused to a fair trial, on the other…2
The Court has recognized that “[t]his balance is very difficult to strike.”3 Quoting Judge
Stephen’s dissent in the ICTY Tadic witness decision, the Trial Chamber has contrasted the “full
respect” due to the fair trial right with the “due regard” due to the protection of witnesses.4 More
pointedly, the Appeals Chamber subsequently stated that the proper approach is in reality “not a
balancing act, but rather an injunction to ensure that witness protection measures do not [the
accused’s] fair trial rights.”5
While the Special Court is not bound to “a slavish and uncritical emulation” of its sister
tribunals,6 its witness protection decisions have been broadly similar. The court has typically
allowed counsel for the party calling a vulnerable witness to withhold identifying information

2

Prosecutor v. Brima, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion for Immediate Protective Measures
for Witnesses and Victims and for Non-Public Disclosure, ¶ 9, SCSL-2003-06-PT, 23 May 2003.
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 1].
3
Prosecutor v. Kondewa, Ruling on the Prosecution Motion for Immediate Protective Measures
for Witnesses and Victims and for Non-Public Disclosure and an Urgent Request for Interim
Measures until Appropriate Protective Measures Are in Place, SCSL-03-12-PT, 10 October 2003,
quoted in Prosecutor v. Kanu, Decision on the Prosecution Motion for Immediate Protective
Measures for Witnesses and Victims, ¶ 28, SCSL-2003-13-PT, 24 November 2003 [reproduced
in accompanying notebook at Tab 5].
4
Prosecutor v. Gbao, Decision on the Prosecution Motion for Immediate Protective Measures for
Witnesses and Victims and for Non-Public Disclosure, ¶ 47, SCSL-2003-09-PT, 10 October
2003. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 4].
5
Prosecutor v. Brima, Decision on Defence Appeal Motion Pursuant to Rule 77(J) on Both the
Imposition of Interm Measures and an Order Pursuant to Rule 77(C)(iii), ¶ 3, SCSL-04-16-AR77,
23 June 2005 [reproduced in accompanying notebook 2]. As shall be seen, infra notes 37-49 and
accompanying test, this construction is in accord with recent ECHR law.
6
Prosecutor v. Gbao, Decision on the Prosecution Motion for Immediate Protective Measures for
Witnesses and Victims and for Non-Public Disclosure, ¶ 11, SCSL-2003-09-PT, 10 October
2003. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 4].
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from the opposing party until a particular time before trial. This period has varied, depending on
the case, from 21 to 42 days.7
Such protective measures require a showing of an objective basis for fear about the
witnesses’ safety. However, the Court does not require that this be established individually for
each witness, which has been deemed an “undue burden”;8 rather, it is sufficient to demonstrate
that “the security threats and risk of interference are real, generalized, and extend to all
witnesses” for a party.9 The same principles are applied to defence as to Prosecution witnesses.10
While recognizing the need at times for defence counsel to seek contact with even protected
witnesses, the Court has required that counsel ask the Court for permission to do so.11 The Court
initially designated the Prosecutor as the appropriate intermediary to seek consent from its
witness.12 But in a recent decision concerning protected defence witnesses, the Trial Chamber

7

Compare id. at ¶ 16 (enlarging suggested 21-day period to 42 days) with Prosecutor v. Norman,
Decision on Prosecution Motion for Modification of Protective Measures for Witnesses, ¶ 36,
SCSL-04-14-T, 8 June 2004 (modifying 42-day period to 21 days) [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 7].
8
Prosecutor v. Norman, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion for Immediate Protective Measures
for Witnesses and Victims and for Non-Public Disclosure, ¶ 14, SCSL-2003-08-PT, 23 May
2003 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 6].
9
Prosecutor v. Norman, Ruling on Motion for Modification of Protective Measures for
Witnesses, ¶ 47, SCSL-04-14-T, 18 November 2004 (emphasis in original) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 8].
10
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Brima, Decision on Joint Defence Application for Protective Measures
for Defence Witnesses, SCSL-04-16-T, 9 May 2006 (citing decisions on Prosecution motions as
stating applicable principles for a defence motion) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 3].
11
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kanu, Decision on the Prosecution Motion for Immediate Protective
Measures for Witnesses and Victims, ¶ 44(k) SCSL-2003-13-PT, 24 November 2003
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 5].
12
Id.
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deemed it preferable that the Witnesses and Victims Section (WVS), rather than the defence,
undertake this task.13 The WVS was deemed to be
in the best position to determine how to contact a protected witness, who may
otherwise feel intimidated, to explain to a witness his or her right to refuse to be
interviewed and to make sure that a proper consent…was obtained from the
witness.14
Indeed, the Trial Chamber has found this to be the appropriate course even where the defence
witnesses concerned were not subject to extraordinary protective measures.15 Moreover, while
recognizing that it is “an act of courtesy rather than obligation to give prior notice to the
opposing Party” regarding witness contacts, it is “prudent and fair” to do so.16
While the Special Court has recognized that “there is no proprietary interest in a witness at
any stage of the proceedings,”17 Trial Chamber II has in fact required the prosecution to obtain
leave from either the defence or the court before contacting any defence witness.18 Moreover, the
right of either side to interview a witness is ultimately subject to the witness’s consent. Quoting a
decision of the ICTY Trial Chamber, the Court has stated that “such right does not carry with it a
corresponding duty on the part of the witness to submit himself or herself to being so
interviewed.”19

13

Prosecutor v. Sesay, Decision on Sesay Defence Motion for Immediate Protective Measures
for Witnesses and Victims and for Non-Public Disclosure, ¶25(j), SLCL-04-15-T, 30 November
2006 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 10].
14
Id at ¶ 24(viii).
15
Prosecutor v. Norman, Decision on Joint Defence Motion Regarding the Propriety of
Contacting Defence Witnesses, ¶ 23, SCSL-04-14-T, 20 June 2006 [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 9].
16
Id. at ¶ 19.
17
Id.at ¶ 17.
18
Prosecutor v. Brima, Decision on Joint Defence Application for Protective Measures for
Defence Witnesses, SCSL-04-16-T, 9 May 2006. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
3].
19
Prosecutor v. Norman, Decision on Joint Defence Motion Regarding the Propriety of
Contacting Defence Witnesses, ¶ 21, SCSL-04-14-T, 20 June 2006 (quoting Prosecutor v. Oric,
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III.
BALANCING OF DEFENCE AND WITNESS INTERESTS GENERALLY
A. Case law of the Ad-Hoc Tribunals
i. ICTY
The ICTY initially embraced the approach of the ECHR, discussed below,20 in approving
the use of anonymous witnesses. In the now-famous Tadic witness protection decision, the Trial
Chamber ruled that witnesses may remain anonymous upon consideration by the court of
whether (1) there is real fear for the safety of the witness or his family; (2) his testimony is
important to the case; (3) there is no evidence that he is untrustworthy; (4) there is no effective
witness protection program; (5) no less restrictive alternative is available.21
Following strong criticism by a dissenting justice22 and by commentators, the ICTY has
moved away from witness anonymity in practice. It now employs protective measures similar to
those now in use in the Special Court, i.e., witness identities are disclosed a short time prior to
trial. 23 With regard to all witness protection measures, the ICTY’s Trial Chambers have
employed a balancing exercise in each case. This exercise considers the need to protect witnesses
important, but secondary to the rights of the accused.24
ii. ICTR
Early on, ICTR Trial Chamber I noted
Trial Transcript, p. 14519, IT-03-68-T, 7 December 2005) [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 9].
20
See infra notes 37-49 and accompanying text.
21
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion Requesting Protective Measures for
Victims and Witnesses, ICTY-95-01-T, 10 August 1995 [reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 24].
22
See, e.g., id., Separate Opinion of Judge Stephen.
23
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Decision on Prosecution Motion for Provisional Protective
Measures Pursuant to Rule 69, IT-01-51-T, 19 February 2002 [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 19].
24
Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Decision on Second Motion by Prosecution for Protective Measures,
IT-99-36, 27 October 2000 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 13].
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the need [for the Tribunal] to maintain a perfect balance between, on the one hand,
the rights of the accused to a fair trial and, on the other hand the rights of the
victims and witnesses, as well as the interest of the international community that
justice be done in the most diligent manner possible.25
ICTR practice has generally followed the ICTY, providing for protection of witness identity until
a short time before trial.26
The Trial Chambers appear to have settled on three criteria for assessing the
appropriateness of special witness protection measures: 1) the relevance and importance of the
testimony; 2) real fear for the witness’s safety, with an objective basis; and 3) whether the
requested measures are “strictly necessary,” i.e., whether less restrictive measures could
suffice.27 The first two criteria determine whether protective measures should be used, while the
third determine which measures should be used.28
The Tribunal’s early witness protection decisions anticipated being effective only “so
long as the said victims or witnesses are not under the protection of the Tribunal.”29 But because
an effective witness protection program for the court has never materialized,30 these measures

25

Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Decision on the Motion Filed by the Prosecution on the Protection
of Victims and Witnesses, ICTR-95-1-T, 6 November 1996 [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 43].
26
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Decision on the Preliminary Motion Submitted by the
Prosecutor for Protective Measures for Witnesses, ICTR-96-3-T, 26 September 1996 (citing
Tadic in summarily granting pretrial nondisclosure) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 52].
27
Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Decision on the Extremely Urgent Request Made by the Defence for
Protection Measures for Mr. Bernard Ntuyahaga, ¶ 28, ICTR-96-7-I, 13 September 1999 (citing
Tadic) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 26].
28
Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko, Decision on Nyiramasuhuko’s Strictly Confidential Ex Parte –
Under Seal – Motion for Additional Protective Measures for Defence Witness BK, ¶ 28, ICTR98-42-I, 15 June 2005 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 47].
29
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Decision on the Motion Filed by the Prosecution on the
Protection of Victims and Witnesses, ICTR-95-1-T, 6 November 1996 [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 43].
30
See, e.g., Prosecution v. Bagosora, Decision on the Prosecution Motion for Special Protective
Measures for Witness “A” Pursuant to Rules 66(C), (69(A) and 75 of the Rules of Procedure and
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generally last until a short time before trial. What is a reasonable period before trial to allow
defence preparation has been litigated, with the trial chambers rejecting periods of one week as
too short in favor of 2-4 weeks.31 While ICTR Rule 69(C) was amended in 2002 to permit
“rolling disclosure” – that is, disclosure scheduled relative to the testimony of the particular
witness rather than the start of trial – this procedure “has not crystallized as the Tribunal’s
practice. Full disclosure before trial is still often required.”32 Rather, rolling disclosure is
permitted where it would “significantly enhance the protection afforded to witnesses.”33
The Tribunal has emphasized that it alone has “ultimate control” over the duration of
protective measures, rejecting a prosecution suggestion that measures be terminable by the
witness.34 Thus, “the witness does not have the right, without authorization from the [Trial]
Chamber, to disclose his or her identity freely.”35
B. Case law of the European Court of Human Rights
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has repeatedly dealt with the balancing of
interests in the context of witness anonymity in a series of cases, largely arising in the
Netherlands. In the first such case, the ECHR held invalid a domestic violence conviction based
primarily on witness statements read out in the court, where the accused had no opportunity to
Evidence, ¶ 29, ICTR-98-4-T, 5 June 2002.(noting “absence of a fully-fledge[d] witness
protection programme”) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 27].
31
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Muhimana, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion for Orders for
Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses, ICTR-95-1B-I, 9 March 2000 (ordering
disclosure 21 days before trial rather than suggested seven days) [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 44].
32
Prosecutor v. Simba, Decision on Prosecution Request for Protection of Witnesses, ¶ 6, ICTR2001-76-I, 4 March 2004 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 53].
33
Id. at ¶ 7.
34
Prosecutor v. Muhimana, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion for Orders for Protective
Measures for Victims and Witnesses, 4, ICTR-95-1B-I, 9 March 2000 [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 44].
35
Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion for Protective Measures for
Witnesses, ICTR-98-44-I, ¶ 12, 6 July 2000 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 39].
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examine the witnesses. The judgment emphasized the key importance of this evidence for the
conviction and stated that, while the reading of statements to police was not itself prohibited,
“the use made of them as evidence must nevertheless comply with the rights of the defence.”36
By emphasizing that the accused had been denied the right “to examine [the witnesses] or have
them examined at any stage of the proceedings,”37 the Court appeared to imply that the
conviction would have been valid if cross-examination before the trial court had been allowed,
even if all witness access prior to trial had been denied.
Over the ensuing years the European Court decided a series of cases concerning anonymous
witnesses, many of them originating from the Netherlands. In the oft-cited Kostovski case, the
petitioner had been accused of armed robberies, attempted manslaughter and escape in large part
on the sworn in camera testimony of a witness whose identity was secret even from the judge.38
The Court stated that “the right to a fair administration of justice holds so prominent a place in a
democratic society that it cannot be sacrificed to expediency.”39 The Court found that the fair
trial right was violated by the “use of anonymous evidence as sufficient to found a conviction,”
but added that the use of anonymous witnesses was not barred per se.40 The Court’s standard was
“whether the proceedings considered as a whole …were fair,”41 which in this context meant
whether “the handicaps under which the defence laboured were counterbalanced by the
procedures followed by the judicial authorities.”42

36

Unterpertinger v. Austria, 110 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 175, 184 (1986) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 54].
37
Id.at 182.
38
Kostovski v. Netherlands, 166 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 434, 435 (1989) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 55].
39
Id. at 449.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 447.
42
Id. at 449.
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In another case (also from the Netherlands), the ECHR held that use of anonymous
witnesses did not render unfair a drug trafficking conviction that had not been “based solely or to
a decisive extent” on anonymous testimony.43 Although stating such evidence should be treated
with “extreme care,” the Court emphasized that this evidence had not been decisive, and that
defence counsel had had an opportunity to question the anonymous witnesses before the judge.
The Court also noted that anonymity safeguarded the witnesses’ rights to life, liberty and security
of person under the European Convention.44 While the decision in Kostovski had been
unanimous, here two judges dissented, stating: “It is not permissible to resolve such problems [of
witness safety] by departing from such a fundamental principle” as the accused’s right to
examine or have examined witnesses against him, which was hampered by anonymity45
In a third Netherlands case, the ECHR found invalid robbery and attempted manslaughter
convictions based “decisively” on anonymous testimony of undercover police. 46 As a matter of
general principle, the Court stated:
Having regard to the place that the right to a fair administration of justice holds in
a democratic society, any measures restricting the rights of the defence should be
strictly necessary. If a less restrictive measure can suffice then that measure
should be applied.47

43

Doorson v. Netherlands, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. 330, 360 (1996) [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 56].
44
Id. at 358.
45
Id. at 362 (Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Ryssdal and De Meyer).
46
Van Mechelen v. Netherlands, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. 647 (1997) [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 57].
47
Id. at 674. Three judges dissenting, calling this “a borderline case.” Id. at 678 (Dissenting
Opinion of Judges Matscher and Valticos).
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On that basis, the Court in 2002 unanimously rejected another Netherlands conviction, where the
anonymous evidence was decisive and the judge failed to probe the well-foundedness of the
witness’s fear.48
C. Case law of national courts
i. United States
In the context of the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, two concurring justices in
the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case of Smith v. Illinois stated that upon a proper evidentiary
showing, it would be proper to exclude from cross-examination “inquiries which tend to
endanger the personal safety of the witness.”49 More recently the Court has stated (albeit in dicta)
that trial court “retain wide latitude…to impose reasonable limits” on that right based on
concerns including witness safety.50 Accordingly, the courts of appeal have upheld prohibitions
on cross-examination as to a witness’s address where danger was indicated and the information
was not material to the defence.51
Summarizing Supreme Court and state precedents, California’s supreme court held in
2000 that the state has broad discretion to deny or defer disclosure of witness identities prior to
trial for protective purposes, but it may never withhold the identity of a crucial witness at trial.52
In other words, the American rule is that it is appropriate “to balance the defense's need for

48

Visser v. Netherlands, [2002] ECHR 108 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 58].
390 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1968) (White, J., concurring) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 64].
50
Delaware v. van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 65].
51
See, e.g., U.S. v. Rich, 262 F.2d 415, 418-19 (2nd Cir. 1959) [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab _66].
52
Alvarado v. Superior Court, 5 P.3d 203, 214-20 (Cal. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 990 (2001).
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 80].
49
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information before trial against the realistic danger to the witnesses” in the pretrial period, but
that at the time of trial the defendant’s right must prevail.53
ii. United Kingdom
Despite a general rule of access to witnesses,54 British courts have in certain cases
permitted witnesses to testify anonymously. The leading case is R v. Taylor, in which the Court
of Appeal held that a trial court should balance the need to protect vulnerable witnesses against
the fair trial right of the accused.55 The court held that for anonymity to be appropriate, there
must be real grounds for fear of danger – but that the witness himself need not be either fearful
or in danger, if others express such concern.56
Though reserved for special cases, witness anonymity now appears to be a firmly
established option in British courts.57 Following incorporation of the European Convention on
Human Rights into UK law, its courts now closely follow the Kostovski line of cases of the
ECHR, which are recognized as being essentially congruent with the British case law.58 As
recently stated by the Court of Appeal, the starting point for this analysis is the recognition that,
“[w]ithout witnesses, justice cannot be done.”59 Thus, it remains for the court to balance the
interests of the accused, the witness and the judicial system in each case.60

53

Id. at 221.
See infra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
55
1995 CRIM. L. REV. 253 (Eng. CA) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 60].
56
Id. at 253.
57
See, e.g., R v. Davis, [2006] EWCA Crim 1155, ¶ 27 (citing several cases) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 63].
58
See, e.g., id. at ¶ 59 (finding “no conflict between the decisions of the European Court and the
observations of the House of Lords on the issue of witness anonymity”).
59
Id. at ¶ 10.
60
Id. at ¶ 62 (quoting Attorney General’s Reference No. 3 of 1999, [2001] 2 AC 91, 118).
54
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iii. Republic of Ireland
In Ireland, questions of balancing fair trial rights against witness safety have arisen in the
Special Criminal Court (SCC) – a non-jury tribunal established to try paramilitary cases, and
later controversially extended to organized crime cases.61 In a case concerning the murder of the
famed investigative journalist Veronica Guerin, Ireland’s Supreme Court endorsed a balancing
approach to the rights of vulnerable witnesses.62 It endorsed the conclusion of the lower appellate
court, which stated:
There can be no doubt but that the constitutional right of individual citizens to the
protection of their life and of their bodily integrity must of necessity take
significant precedence over even so important a right as the right of citizens to the
protection and vindication of their good name.63
Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that grave danger to witnesses may outweigh the interest
of a defendant in disclosure of witness statements, depending on both the evidence of justified
fear and the importance of the statement to the defence.64
Quite recently the Supreme Court of Ireland upheld the SCC’s power to exercise
discretion in limiting cross-examination of police witnesses as to their sources. In doing so the
court stated that
there is an inescapable obligation on the courts to guarantee the overall fairness of
a trial….While there may be derogations for overriding reasons of public interests
from normal procedural rights of the defence, these must not go beyond what is

61

See Irish Council on Civil Liberties, Background Paper on the 30th Anniversary of the
Establishment of the Special Criminal Court (2002), available at
http://iccl.ie/DB_Data/publications/ICCL%20Background%20Paper%20on%20the%2030th%20
Anniversary%20of%20the%20Establishment%20of%20the%20Special%20Criminal%20Court.p
df [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 127].
62
Director of Public Prosecutions v. Special Criminal Court, [1999] 1 IR 60 (quoting court
below) (quoting Burke v. Central Independent Television, [1994] 2 IR 61, 79) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 114].
63
Id.
64
Id.
26

Harper Jean Tobin
International War Crimes Research Lab
Spring 2007
strictly necessary and must, in no circumstances,…imperil the overall fairness of
the trial.65
In arriving at this formulation the Court followed the ECHR jurisprudence.
iv. Australia
In a decision relied upon in Tadic, the Supreme Court of Victoria upheld the use of
anonymous testimony, stating that the interest of witness and accused must be balanced, with the
accused require to demonstrate that the identity of the witness would be of substantial assistance
to his case.66 “The fact that there is good reason to think that disclosure of the [witness’s] identity
may be of some slight assistance to the defence,” wrote the court, “is not enough to outweigh the
public interest in non-disclosure.”67 This decision’s balancing principles have been recognized
by the Federal Court of Australia as stating the rule for sensitive disclosures generally.68
v. New Zealand
The question of anonymity for vulnerable witnesses first arose in New Zealand in a 1986
decision of the intermediate appellate court. The Court of Appeal rejected the possibility of
anonymity, despite the risk that witnesses (in this case, a police informer) might be endangered:
We would be on a slippery slope as a society if on a supposed balancing of the
interests of the State against those of the individual accused the Courts were by
judicial rule to allow limitations on the defence in raising matters properly
relevant to an issue in the trial….The right to confront an adverse witness is basic
to any civilised notion of a fair trial. That must include the right for the defence to
ascertain the true identity of an accuser where questions of credibility may be in
issue.69
65

Director of Public Prosecurtions v. Kelly, [2006] IESC 20 [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 115].
66
Jarvie v. Magistrates’ Court of Victoria, [1995] 1 VR 84 [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 104].
67
Id. at *19.
68
Eastman v. The Queen, 76 F.C.R. 9, 62-64 (Fed. Ct. Austr. 1997) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 105].
69
R v. Hughes, [1986] 2 NZLR 129, 148-149 (CA) (Richardson, J.) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 111].
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The court appeared, then, to take an absolutist approach to the accused’s right to a fair trial,
notwithstanding the possibility of danger to a witness. Over a lengthy and spirited dissent
(emphasizing the right of witnesses to freedom from fear and harm), the Court of Appeal
reaffirmed this decision in 1997, suggesting that any change in this position was for Parliament.70
In response to that decision, the Parliament passed the Evidence (Witness Anonymity)
Amendment Act 1997, which permits witness anonymity under conditions quite similar to those
seen the Kostovski case.71 The Court of Appeal upheld the law, stating that “ensuring the
anonymity of witnesses does not necessarily negate the concept of a fair trial.”72
vi. India
India’s Supreme Court first addressed the balance of rights between the accused and
witnesses in a 1994 decision on the constitutionality of an antiterrorism law giving courts
discretion to withhold witness identities. The Court stated the general rule that witness identities
should be disclosed prior to the time of trial, but recognized “an exception that the Court for
weighty reasons in its wisdom may decide not to disclose the identity and addresses of the
witnesses especially if the potential [witness’s life] may be in danger.”73 In later upholding a
similar statute, the Court stated that “a fair balance between the rights and interests of witness,
rights of accused and larger public interest [had] been maintained” because anonymity would

70

R v. Hines, [1997] 3 NZLR 529 (CA) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 111].
See R v. Atkins, [2000] 2 NZLR 46, ¶ 6 (CA) (quoting statute) [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 113].
72
Id. at ¶ 21.
73
Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, 1994(3) SCC 569, ¶ 290, quoted in LAW COMMISSION OF
INDIA, CONSULTATION PAPER ON WITNESS IDENTITY PROTECTION AND WITNESS PROTECTION
PROGRAMS 47 (2004) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 128].
71
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only be granted in “exceptional circumstances when the special court is satisfied that the life of
the witness is in jeopardy.”74
vii. South Africa and its neighbors
In a landmark 1995 decision, the Constitutional Court of South Africa abolished the prior
blanket privilege for the police docket. 75 The Court stated that the accused’s right to disclosure
of witness statements was “essentially a question to be answered having regard to the
circumstances of each case.”76 Where there is an objectively based concern about the
intimidation of witnesses (or other compelling risks), this must be balanced against the
exculpatory or other value of the material to the defence. The approach of the South Africa’s
Constitutional Court in this area has been adopted by the high courts of Namibia, Lesotho and
Zimbabwe.77
D. Application of these principles to witness contacts
As the preceding overview makes clear, it is generally accepted that when the interests of
accused persons, witnesses, and the administration of justice are in tension, courts may consider
the balance of each in a particular case. Indeed, it is accepted that some limits upon the rights of
the accused to prepare their case may be imposed in order to protect witnesses and secure their
testimony. Such balancing exercises have variously been held to justify withholding witness
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PUCL v. Union of India, 2003 (10) SCALE 967, ¶ 58, quoted in LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA,
supra note 74, at 54.
75
Shabalala v. Attorney-General of the Transvaal, 1995 (12) BCLR 1593 [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 107].
76
Id.
77
S v. Angula, 1997 (9) BCLR 1314 (Namibia) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
108]; Molapo v. Director of Public Prosecutions, 1997 (8) BCLR 1154 (Lesotho) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 109];Banana v. Att’ny Gen., 1999 (27) BCLR 1 (Zim.) (citing
Shabalala) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 110].
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addresses; delayed disclosure of witness identities; and, most controversially, complete
anonymity for witnesses.
The present inquiry, however, necessarily assumes a situation in which defence counsel
have been allowed, at some time before trial, knowledge of witness identities and have the means
to contact them.78 In these circumstances, the justifications for limiting defence access are
greatly attenuated, for three reasons. First, the court in requiring disclosure will already have
determined that the risk of attacks or intimidation upon witnesses by agents or associates of the
accused are not sufficient to justify restriction of defence rights. Second, the court may impose
various limitations on the means of contact with witnesses, including requiring an intermediary
for initial contacts, and requiring that a third party attend any interview or at least accompany the
witness. Third, in domestic courts witnesses universally may choose to avoid any risk of
intimidation or abuse by refusing any contacts with the defence. In light of these considerations it
would seem superfluous for the court to deny for protective purposes contact with a willing
witness. The case law on point, as reviewed in Part IV, appears to bear this out.
It also follows from this analysis, however, and the case law review in Part IV will show,
that there are a two, perhaps three distinct questions relating to witness contacts that may call for
the use of the balancing principles just outlined. The first is the question of what limitations, if
any, the court (as opposed to the parties or the witness) should place on pretrial interviews, such
as excluding the accused. The second is whether, in those courts recognizing the use of subpoena
power to compel pretrial interviews (to date, only the ICTY and ICTR), a subpoena should issue
in a particular instance. The third case for a balancing of interests would arise where the court
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Email from Christopher Staker, Deputy Prosecutor, 21 February 2007 (“The question …
assumes that a party has been served with a witness list by the other party, and then decides that
it wishes to contact a person on that witness list.”)
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claims the unusual prerogative – as does the ICTR – to bar a willing witness from contact with
the defence, a power that would likely be extended to contact with the defence once disclosure
occurs.
IV.

WITNESS CONTACTS GENERALLY
A. Case law
i. ICTY
The ICTY Trial Chamber was initially resistant to defence efforts to contact prosecution

witnesses. It stated that the defence had no right to the addresses of witnesses for purposes of
arranging an interview,79 and indeed no right to conduct pre-trial interviews.80 These holdings
were based on the lack of any specific provision for such interviews in the ICTY Statute, as well
as the concern “that pre-trial interviews may add further to the distress of victims and
witnesses.”81
In 2003, however, the Appeal Chamber in the Mrksic Witnesses Decision stated that:
“Witnesses to a crime are the property of neither the Prosecution nor the Defence; both sides
have an equal right to interview them.”82 Indeed, the Appeal Chamber at that time endorsed the
extraordinary step of issuing subpoenas for pretrial interviews.83 Nevertheless, orders from both
Trial and Appeals Chambers releasing confidential materials to the defence continued to take a
cautious approach to witness contacts, routinely ordering defence counsel
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Prosecutor v. Delalic, Decision on the Defence Motion to Compel the Discovery of Identity
and Location of Witnesses, 18 March 1997 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 15].
80
Prosecutor v. Kovacevic, Decision on Prosecution Motion to Protect Victims and Witnesses,
12 May 1998 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 17].
81
Id.
82
Prosecutor v. Mrksic, Decision on Defence Interlocutory Appeal on Communication with
Potential Witnesses of the Opposite Party, IT-95-13-A, 30 July 2003 [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 20].
83
See infra notes 196-215 and accompanying text.
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[n]ot to contact any witness without first demonstrating to the [issuing] Chamber
that the witness may materially assist [the accused] appeal in some identified way
and that such assistance is not otherwise reasonably available to them. If the
[issuing] Chamber authorizes such contact, the Prosecution will be given a right
to be present during any contact or interview, if the witness requests such
presence.84
A more liberal approach to interviews was subsequently taken by the Trial Chamber in
the 2005 Stanisic Witnesses Decision, which stated that in order avoid
the suggestion that [the Defence] had improperly interfered with [a Prosecution]
witness…it could be prudent for the Defence to discuss its intentions to interview
a witness or potential witness with the Prosecution and to record the interview.85
That Chamber further stated in an oral decision in the Oric case that “this would apply equally to
the inverse situation…when it is the [Prosecutor] seeking to interview a Defence witness….”86
Upon a question by defence counsel, Judge Agius clarified that recording any interview was “a
recommendation” and not an order, and that he had been “very careful in the choice of words” in
that respect.87 Since the same careful words – “could be prudent” were used with respect to both
recording and discussion with opposing counsel, it can be inferred that both were
recommendations and not absolute requirements.
Trial Chamber II provided further clarification in a recent decision in Mrksic, stating that:
there is no need for the Trial Chamber to intervene each time the Prosecution
intends to interview a Defence witness and for the Prosecution to seek the
Chamber’s authorization. However, as a matter of courtesy and in order to avert
84

Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Decision on Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez’s Request for Access to
Tihomir Blaskic’s Fourth Rule 115 Motion and Associated Documents, IT-95-14-A, 5 February
2004 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 12]. See also Prosecutor v. Bralo, Decision
on Access to Confidential Documents, IT-95-17-PT, 20 April 2005 (identical provision)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 11].
85
Prosecutor v. Stanisic, Decision on the Prosecution’s Motion for Protective Measures for
Victims and Witnesses, ¶ 17, IT-04-79-PT, 6 June 2005 [reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 23].
86
Prosecutor v. Oric, Trial Transcript, p. 14519, IT-03-68-T, 7 December 2005 [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 22].
87
Id. at p. 14524.
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the risk of allegations of interference with witnesses, it would be preferable for
the Prosecution to give notice to the Defence of its intentions to interview a
witness from the Defence’s [witness list]. Consideration should also be given…to
recording the interview.88
The Chamber distinguished the situation where a party seeks a subpoena for an interview, stating
that while the issuance of a subpoena must always be justified, “there is no need” to justify an
interview with a willing witness.89
ii. ICTR
Following the ICTY Appeals Chamber decision in Mrksic, it is accepted that both sides
have an equal right to interview witnesses.90 In a 2001 decision granting emergency protective
measures, the Appeals Chamber ordered that defence counsel “notify the Prosecutor of any
requested contact” with the protected witnesses.” 91 The Prosecutor was to contact the witness,
“with the necessary assistance” from the Witnesses and Victims Support Section (WVSS), and
make arrangements for an interview if she consents.92

88

Prosecutor v. Mrksic, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion to Interview Defence Witnesses, ¶ 4,
IT-95-13/1-T, 1 September 2006 (emphasis added) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 21].
89
Id. at ¶ 5.
90
Prosecutor v. Bizimingu, Decision on Prosper Mugiraneza’s Motion to Vary Restrictions in
the Trial Chamber’s Decision of 2 October 2003 Related to Access Jean Kambanda, ¶ 18, ICTR99-50-T, 24 August 2004 (quoting Mrksic witness decision) [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 36]. An earlier decision of Trial Chamber II had denied an interview request as
failing to identify any provision in the Statute or Rules authorizing pretrial interviews. Prosecutor
v. Kajelijeli, Decision on Defence Motion Seeking to Interview Prosecutor’s Witnesses or
Alternatively to Be Provided with a Bill of Particulars, ¶ 6, ICTR-98-44A-T, 12 March
2001[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 40].
91
Musema v. Prosecutor, Decision (Extremely Urgent Motion for Protective Measures for
Witnesses), ICTR-96-13-A, 22 May 2001[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 25].
92
Id.
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More recently, ICTR Trial Chamber II imposed the further requirement that defence
counsel apply to the Tribunal for approval of such an interview.93 Such approval must be made
specifically for each witness, as a request for approval to interview all opposing witnesses has
been regarded as too “speculative.”94 But when a witness is not specifically covered by a
protection order, and in the absence of dispute between the parties, making a motion to the court
is unnecessary; indeed, making such a needless motion has been deemed an abuse of process.95
In other decisions, defence counsel have been required, at the Prosecutor’s request, to use
the Tribunal’s registrar as an intermediary.96 Indeed, ICTR Trial Chamber I in late 2005
described this as its “normal practice.”97
For any witness interview, ICTR Trial Chamber III – citing professional guidelines from
the United Kingdom – has required that such interviews take place in the presence of counsel for

93

Prosecutor v. Nzirorera, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion for Protective Measures for
Witnesses, ¶ 3(i), ICTR-98-44-I, 12 July 2000 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 50].
94
Prosecutor v. Nteziryayo, Decision on Alphonse Nteziryayo’s Request to Meet Witness FAT
in the Absence of the Prosecution, ¶ 9, ICTR-97-29-T, 4 February 2005 [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 47].
95
Prosecutor v. Nzirorera, Decision on the Defence Request for Leave to Interview Potential
Witness, ICTR-98-44-I, ¶ 6, 29 September 2003 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
51].
96
See Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Decision on Defence Written Request to Interview Prosecution
Witnesses, ICTR-898-41-T, 26 September 2005 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
29].
97
Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Decision on Nzuwonemeye Request for Disclosure of Identifying
Information of Witness XXO and Authorization to Interview Him, ¶ 6, ICTR 98-41-T, 31
October 2005 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 30]. This procedure is in any event
required where the witness in question is a detainee of the Tribunal. See Prosecutor v. Ntahobali,
President’s Decision on the Appeal filed Against the Registrar’s Refusal to Permit a Confidential
Interview with Georges Rutaganda, ICTR-97-21-T, 6 June 2005 (registrar’s power to regulate
contact with detainees includes interviews with parties; detainee alone may appeal restrictions on
such interviews to President) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 46].
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the calling party in order to prevent any suggestion of impropriety.98 This is not necessary when
a party interviews its own witness; a motion to require defence counsel presence at the
Prosecutor’s interviews with its own witnesses was deemed frivolous.99
Recently, ICTR Trial Chamber II has struggled with defendant Prosper Mugiraneza’s
attempts to interview reluctant witness Jean Kambanda, the former Prime Minister of Rwanda
who was himself convicted of genocide.100 Kambanda was expected to be a prosecution witness
but consented to a defence interview only on condition that the Prosecutor not be present. Trial
Chamber II held that in these circumstances requiring the Prosecutor’s presence would violate
the rights of the accused and “must be abandoned in the interests of justice.” 101 Accordingly, the
Chamber ordered that a representative of the Registrar attend instead.102 When Kambanda then
refused to be interviewed in the presence of the Registrar’s representative, the Chamber declared
that it was not for the witness to set such conditions, “but rather for the Chamber to ensure that
the fairness and transparency of the judicial process is safeguarded.”103 And finally, when the
Prosecution closed its case-in-chief without calling that same witness, the chamber held the

98

Prosecutor v. Bizimingu, Decision on Prosper Mugiraneza’s Motion to Require the Registrar
to Allow Access to a Witness, ¶ 26, ICTR-99-50-I, 2 October 2003 [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 34].
99
Prosecutor v. Bizimingu, Decision on Prosper Mugiraneza’s Motion for Equality of Arms
Related to Access to Witnesses, ICTR-99-50-I, 23 October 2003 [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 35].
100
See Prosecutor v. Bizimingu, Decision on Prosper Mugiraneza’s Motion to Require the
Registrar to Allow Access to a Witness, ¶ 1, ICTR-99-50-I, 2 October 2003 [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 34].
101
Prosecutor v. Bizimingu, Decision on Prosper Mugiraneza’s Motion to Vary Restrictions in
the Trial Chamber’s Decision of 2 October 2003 Related to Access Jean Kambanda, ¶ 19, ICTR99-50-T, 24 August 2004 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 36].
102
Id. at ¶ 21.
103
Prosecutor v. Bizimingu, Decision on Prosper Mugiraneza’s Extremely Urgent Motion to
Vary Conditions of Interview with Jean Kambanda, ICTR-99-50-T, ¶ 6, 19 January 2005
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 37].
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attendance of a neutral third party no longer necessary for further interviews.104 This is in accord
with the Chamber’s general position that even notice to the Prosecution is unnecessary when the
witness concerned is not listed as a Prosecution witness.105
iii. Australia
Curiously, precedent on witness contacts in an Australian criminal case could not be
found. However, the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory has held, albeit in a civil
case, that,
[w]hile it no doubt serves the interests of justice for a witness to come forward for
the purposes of aiding the prosecution of litigation, whether civil or criminal,
there is no generally enforceable duty on that person to do so. 106
By the same token, however, opposing counsel is “not permitted to obstruct or hinder or dissuade
a witness from…cooperating with inquiries,” but may inform them of the absence of any duty to
do so. 107
iv. South Africa
In the Shabalala case discussed above,108 the Constitutional Court considered the
traditional rule in that country that defence counsel must seek consent from the Prosecution to
104

Prosecutor v. Bizimingu, Decision on Prosper Muraneza’s Emergency Motion to Vary
Conditions on Interview of Jean Kambanda, ¶ 4-5, ICTR-99-50-T, 5 April 2006 [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 38].
105
See Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi, Decision on Joseph Kanyabashi’s Request to Meet SW and
FAT and All Other Persons Whose Identities Were not Disclosed to the Defence, ¶ 14, ICTR-9615-T/ICTR-98-42-T, 23 November 2004 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 41]. See
also Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko, Decision on the “Requête d’Arsène Shalom Ntahobali en
Autorisation de Recontrer le Détenu Georges Rutaganda en l’Absence d’un Représentant de
Procureur et de Greffe, ” ¶ 31, ICTR-98-42-T, 22 September 2005 (requirement of attendence by
Prosecutor or Registrar inapplicable to interview of witness not listed by either party)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 40].
106
Deacon v. Australian Capital Territory, [2001] ACTSC 8, ¶ 111 (emphasis added)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 106].
107
Id. See also Model Rules of Professional Responsibility, Law Council of Australia, R. 17.717.8 (2002) (same) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 119].
108
See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
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interview its witnesses. 109 The Court rejected this blanket rule as incompatible with the
constitutional right to a fair trial, and with the common law rule that there is no property in a
witness.110 While the need for Prosecution consent may be the general rule, the right to a fair trial
would in certain special circumstances necessitate consultations even without the State’s consent.
The risk of prejudice to the defence should then be weighed against the risk of intimidation of
the witness or other prejudice to the State. This risk, the Court noted, was “substantially
deflected” by the witness’s ability to refuse the consultation.111 To reduce the risk of later
disputes as to what was said at an interview, the Court indicated that such consultations should
always occur in the presence of a representative of the Prosecution.112
It is unclear from the South African Constitutional Court’s brief treatment of the issue
what range of circumstances could justify consultation without consent of the Prosecution. The
defence must show that, “on the special circumstances of a particular case, the accused cannot
properly obtain a fair trial without such consultation.”113 The Court gave as an example
situations where the witness may possess vital, time-sensitive information that the defence needs
for further investigation. More specifically, it imagined a vehicular homicide in which the
defence urgently needs to track a particular vehicle in order to establish the damage done to it
before the evidence is “lost, obscured or distorted through subsequent use.”114 Although this was
the only type of situation specifically indicated by the Court, the example appears to be
illustrative rather than exhaustive.

109

Shabalala v. Attorney-General of the Transvaal, 1995 (12) BCLR 1593, *82-83 [reproduced
in accompanying notebook at Tab 107].
110
Id. at *86 (citing Harmony Shipping).
111
Id. at *84.
112
Id. at *85.
113
Id. at *91.
114
Id. at *83.
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What is clearer is that even given sufficient “special circumstances,” the right to
consultation can be overcome by the witness’s refusal, or by reasonable grounds for believing
that a consultation could lead to: (a) witness intimidation; (b) witness tampering, (c) exposure of
State secrets or the identities of informers; or (d) any other prejudice to “the proper ends of
justice.”115
v. Canada
As in other common law jurisdictions, it is long-established in Canada that in civil cases
witnesses are equally available for consultation by either party but are not obliged to give private
interviews; 116 recent criminal cases are to the same effect. For example, Ontario’s provincial
court stated in a 1997 decision that the accused was entitled to an opportunity before trial to
interview witnesses in the absence of Crown attorneys.117 However, the court also stated that a
delay in access to a witness due to legitimate safety concerns was proper, and that neither party
could compel the witness to give an interview.118 Consistent with that absolute right, the same
court refused, in a later case, to issue a subpoena for a pretrial interview, stating that under the
applicable statute subpoenas could issue only for the taking of sworn testimony.119
In Saskatchewan at least, not only the court, but also the prosecution is prohibited from
pressuring a witness in this regard. Its high court has held that the prosecution has no right in law

115

Id. at *92.
See, e.g., Wexler v. Bhullar, 2006 CarswellBC 2410, ¶ 20 (Brit. Colum. S. Ct. 2006) (citing
Harmony Shipping v . Saudi Europe Line Ltd.) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
103].
117
R v. Brown, 1997 CarswellOnt 5992 (Ont. Ct. J. 1997) [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 97].
118
Id.
119
R v. Foote, 2001 CarswellOnt 3038 (Ont. Ct. J. 2001) [reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 100].
116
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to compel or even suggest that a witness submit to an interview with defence counsel, and thus
the defence could not complain of its failure to do so.120
British Columbia case law also holds that neither Crown nor court can compel a pretrial
interview.121 British Columbia’s provincial court has recently stated that the prosecutor cannot
disclose a witness address or telephone number to the defence for the purpose of arranging an
interview without that witness’s consent. 122 It stated that the proper procedure is always for the
prosecutor to tell the witness how to contact the defence counsel, with the proviso that “it is
entirely up to them as to whether or not they wish to speak to her.”123
Finally, in an Ontario trial court decision, the court (mid-trial) ordered the accused excluded
from all witness interviews by defence counsel.124 The court emphasized that defence counsel
was free to speak to any willing Crown witness, but excluded the accused lest his mere presence
caused witnesses to feel intimidated.125
vi. United Kingdom
The common law principle that there is no property in a witness has long roots in English
law, and was most definitively stated in the 1979 case of Harmony Shipping: “In no way can one
side prohibit the other side from seeing a witness of fact, from getting the facts from him and
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R v. Sterling, 1993 CarswellSask 360, ¶ 17 (Sask. Ct. App. 1993) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 99].
121
R. v. Bartkowski, 66 W.C.B. (2d) 85, ¶ 29 (2005) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 101].
122
R v. Dosanjh, 2006 CarswellDC 1429 (B.C. Prov. Ct. 2006) [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 102].
123
Id. at ¶ 16.
124
R v. Munro, 1991 CarswellOnt 3538 (Ont. Ct. J. 1991) [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 98].
125
Admittedly, this terse trial court ruling could be viewed as a more limited one inasmuch as it
was issued in the midst of trial and in the context of an order excluding all witnesses from the
courtroom.
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from calling him to give evidence or from issuing him with a subpoena.”126 This principle
applies to civil and criminal cases alike: thus, a British police officer was once found in contempt
of court for interfering with “the reasonable and proper attempts by a party’s legal advisers to
identify and thereafter interview potential witnesses.”127
With regard to the presence of opposing counsel at interviews, professional ethical
guidelines state that
In order to avoid allegations of tampering with evidence, it is wise for a solicitor
to offer to interview the witness in the presence of a representative of the other
side. If this is not possible a solicitor may record the interview, ask the witness to
bring a representative and ask the witness to sign an additional statement to the
effect that the witness has freely attended the interview, and has not been coerced
into giving the statement or changing his or her evidence.128
While inviting opposing counsel may be best professional practice, this advice reflects
the absence of any enforceable right for the opposing party to insist on attending
interviews.
vii. United States Federal courts
With regard to contacting witnesses, the common law principle that there is no property
in a witness is a commonplace in the United States. “Both sides have an equal right, and should
have an equal opportunity,” to interview witnesses. 129 Lawyers are forbidden to instruct or
advise witnesses not to talk to the other side, or otherwise to interfere with access to witnesses,
126

Harmony Shipping v. Saudi Europe Line Ltd., [1979] 3 All E.R. 177 (Eng. C.A.) [reproduced
in accompanying notebook at Tab 59]. See also Guide to Professional Conduct, Law Society of
England and Wales, Principle 21.10 (“It is permissible for a solicitor acting for any party to
interview and take statements from any witness or prospective witness at any stage in the
proceedings, whether or not that witness has been interviewed or called as a witness by another
party.”). [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 118].
127
Connoly v. Dale, [1996] QB 120, 125 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 61].
128
Guide to Professional Conduct, Law Society of England and Wales, Principle 21.10, cmt. 4
(emphasis added) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 118].
129
Gregory v. U.S., 369 F.2d 185, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1966) [reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 68].
40

Harper Jean Tobin
International War Crimes Research Lab
Spring 2007
and a conviction may be reversed where the prosecution has done so.130 Curiously, however (and
not without criticism), the American Bar Association in 1993 removed from its ethical standards
the requirement that prosecutors affirmatively encourage witnesses to consent to defence
interviews.131
In any event, the right to interview witnesses is subject to the consent of the witness, who
can always refuse.132 As one federal appeals court put it, “All that a defendant is entitled to is
access to a prospective witness.”133 Accordingly, “a witness cannot be compelled to submit to a
pre-trial interview in a criminal case.”134 More specifically, the subpoena rule of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure “does not authorize the government or the defense to subpoena a
witness and require him to report at some place other than where the trial is to be held.”135

130

Id. at 188-89. See also BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 10:64 (2d ed.
1999) (citing cases) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 125]; ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice – Prosecution Function § 3-3.1(d) (“A prosecutor should not discourage or
obstruct communication between prospective witnesses and defense counsel”) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 117].
131
See Davd S. Caudill, Professional Deregulation of Prosecutors: Defence Contacts with
Victims, Survivors and Witnesses in the Era of Victims’ Rights, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 103
(2003) (discussing causes and consequences of this change and urging its reversal) [reproduced
in accompanying notebook at Tab 122].
132
See, e.g., Butterworth v. Kines, 669 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 980 (1982)
(“No right of a defendant is violated when a potential witness freely chooses not to talk; a
witness may of his own free will refuse to be interviewed by either the prosecution or the
defense.”) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 72].
133
United States v. Rice, 550 F.2d 1364, 1374 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 954 (1977)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 69].
134
U.S. v. Pena, 17 F.Supp.2d 33, 37 (D. Mass. 1998) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 77].
135
U.S. v. Standard Oil Co., 316 F.2d 884, 897 (7th Cir. 1963) [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 67]. See also U.S. v. Villa-Chaparro, 115 F.3d 797, 804 (10th Cir. 1997)
(“Courts have consistently interpreted Fed.R.Crim.P. 17(a) to permit the issuance of subpoenas
only to compel attendance at formal proceedings such as hearings and trials”) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 74].
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The trial court may restrict defence access to witnesses before trial where there is a risk to
their safety, including barring personal contact by the accused.136 Although the practice appears
to be far less common than in international criminal tribunals, the court may delay access to a
witness “in obvious danger.”137 But absent a showing of such clear and compelling reasons, the
Prosecution cannot interfere with defence access to witness, including by demanding that it be
notified of any such contacts.138
With regard to initial requests for an interview, the prevailing view is that “[t]he better
procedure is to allow the defense counsel to hear directly from the witness whether he would be
willing to talk to the defense attorney.”139 However, initial contact by a clerk of the court has
been approved “in extreme circumstances.”140 And while the prosecution cannot insist on its
presence, some decisions have approved the trial court’s power to require attendance by court
officer where witnesses “expressed fear of the [defendants].”141
viii. California
Among the most significant American decisions regarding witness contacts is Reid v.
Superior Court, decided in 1997 by a California appellate court. 142 Reid was a high-profile

136

See, e.g., U.S. v. Soape, 169 F.3d 257, 270-71 (5th Cir. 1999) [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 75].
137
U.S. v. Pepe, 747 F.2d 632, 655 (11th Cir. 1984) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 73].
138
See, e.g., U.S. v. Rodriquez-Berrios, 376 F Supp. 2d 118 (D.P.R. 2005) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 78].
139
U.S. v. Walton, 602 F.2d 1176, 1180 (4th Cir. 1979). [reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 71]. This proposition was most recently reiterated, albeit parenthetically, in the highprofile case of accused terrorist Zacarias Moussaoui. See U.S. v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 472
(4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Walton) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 76].
140
Walton, 602 F.2d at 1180, citing U.S. v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407, 425 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 70].
141
Brown, 555 F.2d at 425.
142
Reid v. Superior Court, 55 Cal.App.4th 1326 (1997) [reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 80].
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prosecution for multiple counts of rape, robbery, and attempted rape and robbery, in which there
was “extensive media coverage.”143 Defence counsel moved for disclosure of names and
addresses of the alleged victims, stipulating that these would not be disclosed to the defendant
himself. The prosecutor opposed the motion, stating that each of the victims had expressed a
desire not to be contacted and were indeed “frightful of anything connected with the defendant,
including members of the defense team.”144 The defence had rejected offers by the prosecution to
have the alleged victims contact the defence or meet with defence counsel at a prearranged date
and time, with the understanding that an investigating officer would accompany the victim but
not sit in on the meeting.145 The trial court denied the defence motion and ordered the defence
not to contact any of the victims.146
The Court of Appeal provided the following summary of the case law:147
A criminal defendant does not have a fundamental due process right to pretrial
interviews or depositions.148 However, a defendant does have a right to the names
and addresses of prosecution witnesses and a right to have an opportunity to
interview those witnesses if they are willing to be interviewed.149 … “As a
general rule, a witness belongs neither to the government nor to the defense. Both
sides have the right to interview witnesses before trial. …Exceptions to this rule
are justifiable only under the 'clearest and most compelling circumstances'. …
Where there is no overriding interest in security, the government has no right to
interfere with defense access to witnesses.”150 Therefore, as a general rule, “[a]
lawyer may properly interview any witness or prospective witness for the
opposing side in any civil or criminal action without the consent of opposing
counsel or party.”151 Generally, “[a] defendant is entitled to have access to any
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Id. at 1329.
Id.at 1330 (quoting Prosecutor’s response).
145
Id.at 1330-31.
146
Id. at 1331.
147
Id. at 1332-33 (1997)
148
Citing People v. Municipal Court ( Runyan) 20 Cal.3d 523, 530-531 (1978).
149
Citing Clark v. Superior Court (1961) 190 Cal.App.2d 739, 742-743; People v. Lopez (1963)
60 Cal.2d 223, 246-247.
150
Quoting United States v. Cook (9th Cir. 1979) 608 F.2d 1175, 1180.
151
Quoting Canon 39 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics (1955).
144
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prospective witness although such a right of access may not lead to an actual
interview.”152
Interestingly, and in the contrast to the international tribunals, the court continued:153
“[I]t [is] better procedure [for] the trial court [to] permit[] the attorneys for the
defense to hear directly from the witness ... whether he would be willing to talk to
the defense attorneys, either alone or in the presence of his attorney.”154 “Most
victims are reluctant to discuss a case with defense counsel. To obtain an
interview [the defense] must impress the victim with the need for fairness.”155
In accordance with these principles, the Court of Appeal then considered each of the
claimed grounds for nondisclosure. It quickly dispensed with the ground of embarrassment of the
victims, relying on U.S. Supreme Court precedent holding that embarrassment alone is
insufficient reason to abridge the rights of the defendant.156 The court also rejected the ground of
danger to the victims’ safety because there was no evidence that any victim had been threatened
or was otherwise in danger; in this respect the court distinguished a California case involving
organized crime and prior intimidation of witnesses.157 The court likewise dispensed with the
ground of harassment for lack of evidence – but noted that a Defendant’s counsel who continued
unwanted contact with a witness who refused an interview could be restrained because of the
victim’s “absolute right not to be interviewed.”158 With regard to the ground of the victims’
privacy, the court read the state’s statutes for the protection of sexual assault victims to preclude
any abridgement of defence rights on this basis.159 Thus, the no-contact order was vacated.
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Quoting United States v. Scott (6th Cir. 1975) 518 F.2d 261, 268.
Reid, 55 Cal.App.4th at 1333 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 79].
154
Quoting United States v. Long (8th Cir. 1971) 449 F.2d 288, 296.
155
Quoting BAILEY & ROTHBLATT, INVESTIGATION AND PREPARATION OF CRIMINAL CASES (2d
ed. 1985) § 8.16, p. 171.
156
Reid, 55 Cal. App. 4th at 1336 (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 317-20 (1974))
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 80].
157
Id. (citing Montez v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. App. 4th 763 (1992)).
158
Id. at 1337 n. 4.
159
Id.at 1337-38.
153
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The Supreme Court of California recently held that witnesses have a right to refuse
interviews that cannot be overcome by the defence.160 The supreme court quoted Reid on the
right to disclosure of names and addresses and to interview willing witnesses, but stated that both
“may be limited out of concern for the witness’s safety.”161
ix. Other United States courts
As in the Federal courts, it is well-established in U.S. state courts that “[w]itnesses
belong neither to the [Prosecution] nor to the defence…and should be available to both parties
for the preparation of their case.”162 State high court decisions also establish that the prosecution
is not to interfere with defence access to witnesses, including by advising them to refuse
interviews, or by insisting on its attendance as a condition of any interview.163
The witness’s right to refuse an interview is well-established,164 and cannot be overcome
by subpoena.165 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals states that “Defense counsel does not

160

People v. Panah, 107 P.3d 790, 831-32 (Cal. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 1432 (2006)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 82].
161
Id. at 724-25.
162
Commonwealth v. Adkinson, 813 N.E.2d 506, 516 (Mass. 2004) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Balliro, 209 N.E.2d 308 (Mass. 1965)) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 87].
163
See, e.g., State v. York, 632 P.2d 1261 (Or. 1981) (prosecutor improperly advised witness “it
would be better if they didn’t say anything” to defence) [reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 91] Hunt v. State, 687 So.2d 1154 (Miss. 1996) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 90]; State v. Hofstetter, 878 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1994) (prosecutor may not instruct or advise
witness to decline defence interview without prosecutor present, or to use plea bargain of charge
against witness to enforce such condition) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 95].
See also State v. Caughron, 855 S.W.2d 526, 545-47 (Tenn. 1993) (Daughtry, J., dissenting)
(finding reversible error where police and prosecutor advised child witness’s mother not to
permit defence interview, and citing numerous cases) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 92].
164
See, e.g., Radford v. Lovelace, 212 S.W.3d 72, 82 (Ky. 2006) (citing cases from five other
states and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 85].
165
See, e.g., Hillard v. Commonwealth, 158 S.W.3d 758, 764-65 (Ky. 2005) (following federal
cases cited supra) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 84]. By contrast, the States
vary considerably as to the use of compulsory depositions for criminal discovery. See State v.
Singleton, 853 S.W.2d 490, 493-95 (Tenn. 1993) (summarizing differing approaches and finding
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have a right to interview a witness privately if the witness chooses independently not to be
interviewed or to do so only on conditions.”166 While this right has been confusingly stated as an
element of the “right to compulsory process,”167 even these decisions do not speak of using
compulsory process for an interview, and indeed they assume the right of the witness to
refuse.168 Arizona has gone so far as to guarantee crime victims an absolute right under the state
constitution to refuse an interview (or any other discovery request).169
The right of witnesses to accept interview subject to certain conditions, e.g. the presence
opposing counsel or a third party, is little discussed in American case law, and one may safely
assume that it is recognized as implicit in the absolute right to refuse. Some states, however,
have explicitly recognized this subsidiary right.170 Massachusetts has enshrined a right to impose
“reasonable conditions” in statutory law, which its high court has held to be consistent with
defence rights.171
With regard to limitations for witness safety, Maryland’s supreme court upheld a trial
court’s ruling that the Defendant’s standby counsel, but not the Defendant himself, could

no right under Tennessee law to compulsory interview or deposition) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 94].
166
In re J.W., 763 A.2d 1129, 1134 (D.C. 2000) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
83].
167
State v. Wilson, 65 P.3d 657, 662 (Wash. 2003) (quoting State v. Burri, 550 P.2d 507 (1976))
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 96].
168
See id. (aff’ing State v. Wilson, 31 P.3d 43, 45 (Wash.App. 2001) (“The witness had the right
to refuse the interview”)).
169
See State v. Roscoe, 912 P.2d 1297, 1302-03 (Ariz. 1996), applying ARIZ. CONST. art. II, §
2.1(A)(5) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 79].
170
See State v. Flick, 425 A.2d 167, 170 (Me. 1981) (“A witness, or her custodian, may refuse
such an interview entirely or impose any conditions deemed necessary”) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 88].
171
See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 675 N.E.2d 791 (Mass. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 934
(1998) (approving 258B Mass. G.L. § 3(m)) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 86].
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interview a witness in custody where both men were considered “extremely dangerous.”172 The
court stated that it is proper for the trial judge
to place certain limitations and restrictions on a party's access to potential
witnesses if in the court's discretion such restrictions are reasonably necessary for
the protection of the witness or for security purposes.173
The court thus found no reversible error in the denial of a personal interview. Similarly, the State
of Washington’s intermediate appellate court, while finding improper a prosecutor’s advice not
to grant an interview, noted that a trial court could “reasonably control access to a witness under
appropriate circumstances.”174 As an example of this control, the Mississippi Supreme Court has
upheld a trial court’s requirement that a court officer attend a defence interview of a minor rape
victim.175
In an unusual application of this principle, New Hampshire’s high court in State v. Kidder
upheld a misdemeanor charge against an attorney for violating a civil domestic violence
protection order against his client by contacting the other party on his behalf, holding that the
protection order did not violate due process rights.176 The court recognized as “axiomatic” the
right of Defendants to pretrial investigation, including witness interviews.177 However, the court,
citing Reid, further stated that this right “may be curtailed to protect a witness from harassment
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Grandison v. State, 506 A.2d 580, 608 (Md.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 873 (1986). [reproduced
in accompanying notebook at Tab 89].
173
Id.
174
State v. Hofstetter, 878 P.2d 474, 482 (Wash.App. 1994) [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 95].
175
See Hunt v. State, 687 So.2d 1154, 1151 (Miss. 1996) (citing Cannon v. State, 190 So.2d 848
(1966)) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 90].
176
843 A.2d 312 (N.H. 2004) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 91].
177
Id. at 317.
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or abuse.”178 To the extent that this curtailment hampered legitimate investigation, the defendant
should have petitioned the court for an exception to the no-contact order.179
A subsequent article in the New Hampshire Bar Journal noted that Kidder had “sent
shockwaves through New Hampshire’s legal community,” prompting defence attorneys to
abandon previously routine communications with domestic violence plaintiffs.180 The author
criticized the decision for misapplying Reid, which had placed the burden on the State to prove
“clear and compelling circumstances.” By contrast, Kidder permitted a blanket no-contact order
without any showing beyond the complaint itself, and placed the burden on the defendant to
show why access was warranted.181 Ultimately, the New Hampshire legislature amended its
domestic violence law to make clear that no-contact orders would not prohibit contacts by
attorneys for legitimate purposes.182
B. Discussion
i. General principles
Not withstanding the early, and subsequently abandoned, contrary view of the ICTY Trial
Chamber, it is generally accepted in both common law courts and the ad-hoc tribunals that both
parties have a right to interview witnesses, and it is generally held that this right is an equal one
of both parties, irrespective of which party is calling a particular witness. Of those common law
countries where relevant case law was found, South Africa today appears to be the only one that,
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Id.
Id.
180
Mary Krueger, Beyond State v. Kidder: Defining a Defendant’s Right to Contact Witnesses in
Domestic Violence Cases, Fall 2005 N.H.B.J. 22, available at
http://www.nhbar.org/publications/archives/display-journal-issue.asp?id=298 [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 124].
181
Id.
182
See N.H. Rev. Stat. § 173-B:5-a (2006) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 116].
179
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like the Special Court, requires the defence to seek the consent of either the Prosecution or the
trial court before contacting a prosecution witness.
The practice of the ad-hoc tribunals with regard to seeking prior permission for
interviews, appears inconsistent, for which there appear to be two explanations. First, the ICTY
and ICTR appear to have moved over time from a more cautious approach to witness contacts –
requiring court approval – to a more liberal one in which the default rule is freedom of access to
witnesses. Additionally, the ad-hoc tribunals – including the Special Court for Sierra Leone –
distinguish between those witnesses who are and those who are not subject to extraordinary
protective measures. Since witnesses who are subject to such measures have already been
deemed to be subject to considerable risk, this distinction is sensible. The tribunals’ class-based
approach to protective measures, however – that is, the acceptance of proof of risk for entire
groups of witnesses rather than on an individual basis – may have the consequence that, in the
context of a particular case, open access may be more the exception than the rule.
ii. Interference with access to witnesses
Setting aside the aforementioned case of South Africa, it is axiomatic that along with the
right to interview opposing witnesses there attaches the obligation not to interfere with the other
party’s access to one’s own witnesses. This is unequivocal from the case law of Australia,
Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the American case law cataloguing a
wide variety of prohibited obstructive practices by prosecutors. On the other hand, it is entirely
proper to advise witnesses of their rights with regard to pretrial interviews. While American
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prosecutors were at one time enjoined to affirmatively encourage interviews,183 it is clearly
inappropriate to pressure a witness in either direction.184
All of these propositions are consistent with the duty of counsel before the Special Court
for Sierra Leone to act courteously and respectfully,185 the duty to respect the rights and interests
of witnesses and to ensure they are informed of their rights,186 and attorneys’ overriding duty to
act in the interests of justice. 187
iii. Initial contact with witnesses
The case law shows considerable variance of opinion as to the appropriate procedure for
initially contacting witnesses to arrange for a pretrial interview. The current approach in British
Columbia – for the Prosecutor to notify the witness that the defence would like an interview188 –
reflects concern for the witness’s privacy, safety and freedom of choice. The witness has already
been in contact with the Prosecution and may simply not wish anyone else to have his or her
address or other contact information. Moreover, the Prosecutor is better positioned to make clear
to the witness that an interview is purely voluntary.
On the other hand, the California court in Reid, reflecting the general American rule,
found it preferable that the defence contact the witness directly.189 It was concerned that the
defence be able to persuade an otherwise reluctant witness to grant an interview by impressing
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See Caudill, supra note 122, at 115-17 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 122].
See R v. Sterling, 1993 CarswellSask 360, ¶ 17 (Sask. Ct. App. 1993) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 99].
185
Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel with Right of Audience before the Special Court of
Sierra Leone, art. 7 (2006/2006) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 120].
186
Id., art. 10.
187
Id., art. 8..
188
R v. Dosanjh, 2006 CarswellBC 1429, ¶ 16 (B.C. Prov. Ct. 2006) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 102].
189
Reid v. Superior Court, 55 Cal.App.4th 1326, 1333 (1997) [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 80].
184
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upon the witness the need for fairness. Moreover, this position undoubtedly reflects American
courts’ not infrequent experience with overzealous prosecutors explicitly or implicitly
discouraging the giving of interviews to the defence. However, even a few American decisions
approved resort to the court as an intermediary in sensitive cases.
Here as elsewhere, concern for the autonomy and rights of the witness is in tension with
not only with the rights of the defence but also with the interest in a full, fair trial, which is best
served by robust pretrial discovery so long as it too is fair. Either of the above approaches may
constitute a fair balance of the two so long as counsel are at all times observant of their ethical
duties.
Yet although the Special Court should assume that the highest ethical standards will be
observed by both the prosecutor and defence counsel, the Special Court’s established practice of
contact by the Witnesses and Victims Section in the first instance190 – similar to that of the ICTR,
which assigns this task to the Registrar191– seems the best. Defence counsel will have an
incentive to emphasize the desirability of granting an interview, yet it will have a disincentive to
respect the witness’s right to refuse. With the prosecutor the position will be the opposite, and
even if the contacting party behaves properly, suspicions may arise. As has been noted by the
Special Court, the WVS is best positioned to underscore both the desirability of cooperation and
the right to refuse.192 While this approach may place significant logistical demands on the office
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Prosecutor v. Sesay, Decision on Sesay Defence Motion for Immediate Protective Measures
for Witnesses and Victims and for Non-Public Disclosure, ¶25(j), SLCL-04-15-T, 30 November
2006 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 10].
191
See Prosdecutor v. Bagosora, Decision on Nzuwonemeye Request for Disclosure of
Identifying Information of Witness XXO and Authorization to Interview Him, ¶ 6, ICTR 98-41T, 31 October 2005 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 30].
192
Prosecutor v. Sesay, Decision on Sesay Defence Motion for Immediate Protective Measures
for Witnesses and Victims and for Non-Public Disclosure, ¶24(vii), SLCL-04-15-T, 30
November 2006 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 10].
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to which it is assigned, it will do the most to ensure both the perception and the reality of fairness
to all. It may be desirable, however, to make the use of an intermediary optional where a witness
is not subject to extraordinary protective measures.
iv. Presence of the opposing party or a third party
With, once again, the exception of South Africa, it appears to be the general rule in
national courts that the prosecution cannot, consistent with the right of access to witnesses,
demand to be present at an interview by defence counsel. Though no case on point was found, it
may be assumed that the converse applies as well. The current position of the ICTY Trial
Chambers is in accord, with the recommendation of recording any interview being substituted for
any requirement of attendance by opposing counsel.
By contrast, the ICTR Trial Chambers appear still to require, at least as a general rule, the
presence of the calling party at interviews in order to ensure the transparency of the process.
When a putative prosecution witness refused to give an interview with defence with others
present, ICTR Trial Chamber II permitted the registrar to attend in lieu of the Prosecutor but held
firm to the condition that some third party attend.193 American decisions, by contrast, reserve
such a requirement for extraordinarily sensitive cases.
Where opposing counsel does not attend, there are of course some dangers: not only that
the witness may feel intimidated, but that dispute may later arise as to what was said. The ICTY
solution of making recordings goes far in alleviating these concerns, though it is not mandatory
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Prosecutor v. Bizimingu, Decision on Prosper Mugiraneza’s Extremely Urgent Motion to
Vary Conditions of Interview with Jean Kambanda, ICTR-99-50-T, ¶ 6, 19 January 2005
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 37].
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and there remains the possibility that recordings may be doctored.194 On the other hand, the
counsel seeking the interview may be legitimately concerned that the attendance of opposing
counsel could inhibit a full and free discussion with the witness. Moreover, as seen in the ICTR
there will occasionally be witnesses who themselves prefer a private interview. While requiring
the presence of opposing counsel may not be inconsistent with the rights of the defence, it is not
strictly necessary to ensure fairness or safety and, since requiring attendance by a court
representative instead may prove unduly burdensome, the recording solution seems a reasonable
one.
With regard to witnesses’ right to require presence of the calling party, guidance comes
the American courts, which have recognized that witnesses may impose conditions on interviews,
including one of this kind. This would appear to be consistent with the witness’s right to refuse
outright.
v. Presence of the accused
Another condition the court may place on defence access to witnesses is that all contacts
be by counsel only and not by the accused personally, as was done in cases in Maryland and
Ontario. This requirement may be used when a witness refuses to speak in the presence of the
accused, where there is otherwise some concern that a witness may not speak freely, or even
where the prosecution fears some form of collusion between witness and accused. In this
circumstance there is all the more reason for defence counsel to record all interviews.
To be sure, enforced separations of the accused defense counsel have proved
controversial with regard to disclosure of sensitive information. While a “special advocate” may
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Safeguards to ensure the integrity of interview recordings themselves could also be
considered, ranging from requiring use of specific recording devices or multiple recordings to
requiring transcription by a court reporter.
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be appointed to deal with such matters in the United Kingdom, the same procedure has been
rejected by the Supreme Court of Ireland as incompatible with a well-functioning attorney-client
relationship.195 However, concerns about the attorney-client relationship appear minimal when
lawyers are not required to withhold information from clients, but are simply required to conduct
interviews without them. Although on-the-spot consultation with the client may be most
advantageous, courts are unlikely to see the deprivation of this strategic advantage as decisive. It
is therefore hardly surprising that the Maryland and Ontario decisions do not even mention such
concerns.
V.

INTERVIEW SUBPOENAS: AN INNOVATION OF THE AD-HOC
TRIBUNALS
A. Interview subpoenas in the ICTY
In the Krstic Decision on Application for Subpoenas, the Appeals Chamber took the very

unusual step of issuing a subpoena for the purpose of a pretrial interview by defence counsel.196
It found the power for such subpoenas to lie within the chamber’s powers under Rule 54 of the
Tribunal, which generally authorizes orders “necessary […] for the preparation or conduct of the
trial.”197 In so doing, it rejected the prosecutor’s contention that Rule 54 authorized subpoenas
only for the giving of in-court testimony.198
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Compare R v. H, [2004] 2 AC 134 (UK) (approving procedure as an alternative total
nondisclosure) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 62], with Director of Public
Prosecutions v. Special Criminal Court, [1999] 1 IR 60 (Ire.) (holding incompatible with
constitutional justice any requirement that defence counsel keep secrets from his client)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 114].
196
Prosecutor v. Krstic, Decision on Application for Subpoenas, IT-98-33-A, 1 July 2003
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 18].
197
Id.at ¶ 10.
198
Id. at ¶ 9.
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In order to obtain such an order, a party would need to show “a reasonable basis” for
believing there is “a good chance” that a person will be able to give “materially” useful
information with regard to “clearly identified issues” in the case.199 This assessment would
depend on the position of the witness with regard to relevant events, her opportunity to observe
those events, and any prior statements about those events, as well as her relationship to the
accused.200
While this decision appears a marked departure from the practice of domestic courts, the
Appeals Chamber added some curious caveats. It stated that where the witness had previously
been uncooperative, a subpoena would issue only if the court found it “reasonably likely that
there would be cooperation” with that order.201 If this appeared unlikely, the court should
summon the witness and explain the importance of cooperation.202 These statements may seem to
suggest that, even under this decision, a pretrial interview ultimately depends upon the witness’s
voluntary cooperation.
Any doubts as to the course actually approved by the Appeals Chamber are further
dispelled by the dissenting opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, who thought a subpoena for pretrial
interview beyond the court’s powers.203 He wrote:
It is one thing for the Appeals Chamber to use its powers under [Rule 54] to
remove any difficulties which might prevent a potential witness from coming
forward [for an interview]; it is another thing for [it] to …compel the potential
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Id. at ¶ 10.
Id. at ¶ 11.
201
Id. at ¶ 12
202
Id.
203
Id., Dissenting opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen. Indeed, Judge Shahabuddeen opined that
even a sworn but off-site deposition was not within the court’s statutory powers. Id. at ¶ 36. To
the extent that calling a witness without opportunity to know what she will say disadvantages a
party, he argued this is a simply risk counsel must decide upon. Id. at ¶ 33.
200
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witness to come forward to the defence, and more particularly under the threat of
penal sanctions.204
Judge Shahabuddeen chiefly faulted the court for failing to cite any precedent, domestic or
international, for compelling a pretrial interview under such a threat. “I am not satisfied,” he
concluded, “there is any such instance.”205 In his view, therefore, the decision struck the wrong
balance between defence and witness interests and did so without precedent.
Shortly thereafter, the Appeals Chamber in Mrksic issued another decision confirming the
power to subpoena for pretrial interviews.206 It noted that under the Tribunal’s Rule 39 the
Prosecutor was authorized to “summon and question suspects, victims and witnesses,” and that
“both sides have an equal right” to interview witnesses.207 Both sides are “entitled to take
reasonable steps to persuade” reluctant witnesses to submit to an interview, and may ultimately
apply for a subpoena under Rule 54.208 The decision noted that unlike the persuasive efforts of
the parties, a subpoena for interview “would have a legally binding effect that is enforceable by
the application of criminal sanctions.”209
The Appeals Chamber further clarified the requirements for an interview subpoena in the
Halilovic case.210 It stated that preparing a more effective cross-examination was not, in and of
itself, a sufficient reason to order a pretrial interview.211 Calling the subpoena “a weapon that
must be used sparingly,” the Chamber stated that “it must be used where it would serve the
204

Id. at ¶ 28.
Id. at ¶ 42.
206
Prosecutor v. Mrksic, Decision on Defence Interlocutory Appeal on Communication with
Potential Witnesses of the Opposite Party, IT-95-13-A, 30 July 2003 [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 20].
207
Id.
208
Id.
209
Id.
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Prosecutor v. Halilovic, Decision on the Issuance of Subpoenas, IT-01-48-AR73, 21 June
2004 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 16].
211
Id. at ¶ 10.
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overall interests of the criminal process, not where it would merely facilitate a party’s task in
litigation.”212 By the same token, however, an interview subpoena was not per se unavailable
because a witness was on the opposite party’s witness list.213 Rather, it is for the Trial Chamber
to decide whether an interview is likely to lead to material that is useful above and beyond
preparing a more effective cross-examination.214 Judge Shahabuddeen concurred in this decision,
stating he would follow the Krstic holding “as long as it stands,” but made clear his continuing
opposition to it, and noted again the lack of any apparent precedent.215
Nevertheless, apparent contradiction on this point has continued. In its subsequent oral
decision in the Oric case, already discussed,216 Trial Chamber II stated breezily:
Needless to say, [the right to interview witnesses] does not carry with it a
corresponding duty on the part of the prospective witness to submit himself or
herself to being so interviewed.217
As already noted, this conclusion was quoted and followed by Trial Chamber I of the
Special Court for Sierra Leone.218 Strangely, in the latter decision Trial Chamber I did
not mention the ICTY Appeals Chamber’s approval of interview subpoenas, even though
it cited the Mrksic witness decision on other points.
B. Interview subpoenas in the ICTR

212

Id.
Id. at ¶ 11.
214
Id. at 15.
215
Id., Declaration of Judge Shahabuddeen. Another judge dissented, but not because of any
disagreement in principle; he felt the Appeals Chamber had misconstrued the holding of the Trial
Chamber. Id., Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weinberg de Roca.
216
See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
217
Prosecutor v. Oric, Trial Transcript, p. 14519, IT-03-68-T, 7 December 2005 [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 22].
218
Prosecutor v. Norman, Decision on Joint Defence Motion Regarding the Propriety of
Contacting Defence Witnesses, ¶ 21, SCSL-04-14-T, 20 June 2006 [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 9].
213
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In 2003, ICTR Trial Chamber II stated unequivocally – in accordance with domestic case
law – that if a witness is not willing to be interviewed, “then that is the end of the matter.”219 But
more recently Trial Chamber III, following the ICTY decisions, recognized the possibility in
appropriate cases to issue a subpoena for a pretrial interview. 220
Trial Chamber III stated that in granting a subpoena it would consider a party’s efforts to
obtain voluntary cooperation; the likely importance of the witness’s testimony; the need for a
pretrial meeting for purposes beyond more effective cross-examination; and the likelihood of a
subpoena to secure cooperation.221 After stating these principles, though, the Chamber denied the
subpoena being requested because the Defence had not showed a sufficient need for “a tool
which carries serious repercussions.”222 That interview subpoenas may be granted under these
principles has been confirmed by recent decisions, 223 including one in which a former UN
official was subpoenaed for a meeting with defence counsel.224
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Prosecutor v. Mugiraneza, Decision on Prosper Mugiraneza’s Motion to Require the Registrar
to Allow Access to a Witness, ICTR-99-50-I, 2 October 2003 [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 45].
220
Prosecutor v. Karemera, Decision on Defence Motion for Issuance of Subpoena to Witness T,
ICTR-98-44-T, 8 February 2006 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 42].
221
Id. at ¶ 4 (citing ICTY cases).
222
Id. at ¶ 6. To wit, the defence had met with the witness twice prior to his appearing on the
Prosecution witness list; substantial documentary discovery had been had concerning the witness;
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Finally, it should be noted that the obligation under the ICTR Statute for States to assist
the Tribunal extends to the efforts of both parties to prepare their case.225 Accordingly, Trial
Chamber I has issued requests to both France and Tanzania to help facilitate interviews with
former state officials, apparently reserving the possibility of issuing subpoenas at a later date.226
C. Should interview subpoenas be used by other tribunals?
As noted in Judge Shuhabuddeen’s dissent, the use ad-hoc tribunals’ use of subpoenas for
private pretrial interviews appears to be an unprecedented innovation in criminal procedure.
Curiously, the ICTR and ICTY appear to have given scant consideration to the novelty of this
procedure and to the objections that will naturally be made to it, instead treating the matter as no
different from the issue of a subpoena for in-court testimony. Because it appears unprecedented,
and because it involves the compulsion of witnesses upon threat of penal sanction for a purpose
arguably less essential to the administration of justice than appearance in court, this use of the
subpoena power should be considered with caution.
However, its rejection by national courts should not cause it to be rejected out of hand,
particularly in light of the exceptional position of international criminal tribunals. Because such
tribunals and the grave crimes they address are of special concern to the international community,
robust discovery and the fullest possible airing of the evidence are critical both to the legitimacy
of the tribunals’ judgments and to the historical record they seek to establish. While the
circumstances of these tribunals also call for extraordinary solicitude for the rights and interests
of witnesses and victims, tribunals should facilitate discovery to the maximum extent consistent
225
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with adequate witness protection.
Thus, the ICTY and ICTR’s extraordinary practice of issuing subpoenas for pretrial
interviews should be considered carefully. While it is a controversial departure from the practice
of common law national courts, it may be justified by the unusual characteristics of international
criminal tribunals.
VI.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Balancing the fundamental rights of accused persons with the safety and privacy of

witnesses to crimes is a problem that has provoked much discussion in national courts and has
particular significance for international criminal tribunals. With regard to the particular issue of
contact with opposing witnesses whose identities are known, however, some general rules appear
to have crystallized. First, witnesses are not the properly of either prosecution or defence, and
each sides should in general have equal access to them in the preparation of its case. Second, it is
prohibited for either party to interfere with the access of the other to witnesses, including by
advising witnesses not to cooperate.
While it appears to be the practice of the ICTR to require attendance at witness
interviews by the calling party (or, alternatively, by a court representative), in national courts and
the ICTY the calling party cannot impose this requirement. National courts vary as to whether
the party seeking access or the calling party should make the initial contact with a witness sought
to be interviewed; the ICTR practice of using the registrar for the initial contact may be ideal in
the context of international criminal tribunals. In the ICTY, parties are encouraged to notify one
another of their efforts to interview opposing witnesses, and to record interviews. Excluding the
accused him- or herself from opposing witness interviews is another precaution that may
sometimes be desirable to secure full cooperation from witnesses.
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Finally, national courts in adversarial systems universally recognize the unfettered right
of witnesses to refuse pretrial interviews, with some jurisdictions enshrining this right in
statutory or constitutional law. By contrast, the ICTY and ICTR have embraced the extraordinary
procedure of permitting parties to apply for subpoenas for pretrial interviews. This procedure
appears unprecedented in national practice and should be view with caution, but may be justified
by the exceptional characteristics and mandate of international criminal tribunals.
In summary, while courts have differed greatly as to the appropriate balance of witness
and defence rights in matters of disclosure, with regard to contacting known witnesses the
dominant approach is of free and equal access to any witness subject only to the voluntary
cooperation of witnesses and procedural requirements to ensure fairness, integrity and witness
safety.
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